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WHEN AN APPEAL GOES WRONG: 
A “CRIMINAL JUSTICE NIGHTMARE”*
David R. Dow 
Jeffrey R. Newberry** 
I. INTRODUCTION
When American civilization finally crumbles, and future 
historians download the wreckage, it is conceivable that 
they will cite the case of Jerry Hartfield to explain to their 
curious audience how law and justice in our time could be 
so bluntly subverted by the very men and women whose job 
it was to administer it. Look how these public officials 
elevated form over substance, our descendants will say; 
look how hard they defended such manifest injustice. Look 
how long it took for the justice system to do justice, even 
*Hartfield v. State, 516 S.W.3d 57, 68 (Tex. App. 2017) (recognizing that “[t]he State’s 
negligence in this case created a criminal justice nightmare for Hartfield and the system at-
large”), discretionary rev. refused (May 17, 2017), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 
473 (2017); see also Richard Pérez-Peña, “Justice Nightmare”: 32 Years in Texas Prisons 
After Conviction Voided, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/ 
19/us/jerry-hartfield-texas-prison.html. 
**David R. Dow is Cullen Professor at the University of Houston Law Center and 
Rorschach Visiting Professor of History at Rice University. Jeffrey R. Newberry is Legal 
Clinic Supervisor at the University of Houston Law Center. They represented Jerry 
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after it became clear to the world that a man was 
imprisoned for decades without a viable judgment against 
him.1
June 12, 2017, was Jerry Hartfield’s first day of freedom in 
almost forty-one years, even though he had prevailed in the 
1980 appeal of his death sentence.2 The Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals (CCA) ordered a new trial in that proceeding, but years, 
and then decades, went by and no new trial was held. Hartfield 
spent more than thirty years in a Texas state prison before he 
finally saw the inside of a courtroom. In this article, we tell his 
story.
In Part II we provide an overview of Hartfield’s federal and 
state appeals. In Part III, we discuss the procedural history in 
greater detail. In Part IV, we discuss the central legal issue 
presented by Hartfield’s case—the right to a speedy trial. In Part 
V, we touch on an ancillary matter and reflect on the perverse 
incentive created by the Fifth Circuit’s disposition of Hartfield’s 
pre-trial habeas application. Finally, in Part VI, we offer some 
concluding thoughts. 
II. OVERVIEW
Incarcerated since being arrested in September 1976 for the 
murder of Eunice Lowe, Hartfield had always insisted on his 
innocence.3 But he was nonetheless convicted after his 1977 trial 
and sentenced to death.4
In 1980, the CCA vacated Hartfield’s conviction and 
ordered a new trial because a potential juror was wrongfully 
excused for cause.5 That new-trial order was not carried out. 
1. Andrew Cohen, Held Without Retrial for 11,800 Days, Texas Inmate Still Waits for 
Justice, ATLANTIC (Jan. 7, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/01/ 
held-without-retrial-for-11-800-days-texas-inmate-still-waits-for-justice/266865/. 
2. Hartfield v. State, 645 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (en banc) (reversing 1977 
conviction and remanding for new trial). 
3. Cohen, supra note 1 (indicating that Hartfield maintains that the confession he made 
after his arrest was coerced and that he continues to assert his innocence).  
4. Hartfield, 516 S.W.3d at 59 (summarizing 1980 trial: “[n]early four decades ago, a 
Wharton County jury convicted appellant Jerry Hartfield of the capital murder of Eunice 
Lowe and assessed his punishment at death”). 
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Instead, the Governor purported to commute Hartfield’s 
sentence to life in prison.6 But because the CCA’s order had 
become final before the State sought a commutation,7 the 
Governor lacked the power to commute the sentence, and his 
action had no legal effect. 
Hartfield, whose IQ places him in the category of mild-to-
moderate intellectual disability,8 is barely literate and could not 
engage the courts on his own. But a fellow inmate realized in 
2006 that Hartfield was more than two decades overdue for his 
new trial and filed multiple post-conviction applications for 
writs of habeas corpus and petitions for writs of mandamus in 
the CCA seeking one.9 In response, the CCA issued a series of 
boilerplate denials.10
In 2007, Hartfield’s inmate adviser finally resorted to filing 
in federal court. That court realized something unusual was 
going on in Hartfield’s case and appointed the federal public 
defender’s office to represent him. Thus began an almost 
decade-long period during which the State argued repeatedly 
that Hartfield was not entitled to the new trial that its highest 
criminal court had ordered. 
This initial round of federal proceedings culminated in the 
Fifth Circuit’s certifying a question to the CCA, asking whether 
the Governor’s commutation had been effective, and if not, 
whether Hartfield’s confinement was justifiable on some other 
6. Hartfield v. Thaler, 403 S.W.3d 234, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (explaining that 
mandate issued on March 4, 1983, and that governor purported to commute sentence on 
March 16, 1983). 
7. Id. at 239 (explaining that once mandate issued there was no sentence to commute). 
8. See, e.g., Amended Brief for Appellant at 18, Hartfield v. Tex. (Tex. App. May 16, 
2014) (No. 13-14-00238-CV) (indicating that at the time of his first trial, an expert had 
determined that Hartfield’s “full-scale IQ score was fifty-eight”) [hereinafter Amended
Appeal Brief]. 
9. Ex Parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805, 806 (Tex. App. 2014) (discussing procedural 
history through August 2014). 
10. Seven years later, the CCA would explain that it realized at the time—i.e., in 
2006—that Hartfield was being held under no conviction or sentence, but had denied him 
relief on his speedy-trial claim because he had not used the proper vehicle to raise the 
issue. Hartfield, 403 S.W.3d at 239–40 (“When Petitioner filed a state application for writ 
of habeas corpus, he filed it under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.07. Because 
Article 11.07 relates only to post-conviction applications for writ of habeas corpus and 
there was no judgment of conviction against Petitioner, this was not the proper procedure, 
and we denied his application. He also filed an application for leave to file a petition for 
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basis.11 We took over Hartfield’s representation at that point, 
and our first action was to ask the CCA not only to answer the 
Fifth Circuit’s question, but to find Hartfield’s confinement 
unlawful, open one of the dismissed habeas applications, and 
order Hartfield released. 
The CCA did not take that bold step. Nevertheless, six 
months after agreeing to answer the certified question, the CCA 
issued an opinion explaining that because Hartfield’s conviction 
and sentence were vacated upon its earlier order’s becoming 
final in 1983, the subsequent attempt to commute the sentence 
was ineffective and invalid. The CCA also confirmed—as the 
federal courts had speculated—that Hartfield had failed to 
exhaust his speedy-trial claim in state court and that it had 
denied relief on the pleadings filed in 2006 and 2007 because 
Hartfield had failed to raise his claim in a procedurally correct 
vehicle. The CCA then noted that Hartfield could exhaust the 
speedy-trial claim in either of two ways: through a pre-trial 
application for a writ of habeas corpus (which would be 
immediately appealable), or by a motion to set aside the 
indictment (which could be appealed only after a subsequent 
trial).12
A week later, we heeded the CCA’s advice and filed a pre-
trial habeas application in the state trial court raising Hartfield’s 
speedy-trial claim. The trial court viewed the application as a 
demand for new trial as well, and so, while proceedings on the 
speedy-trial claim were pending, proceedings toward giving 
Hartfield the new trial that the CCA had ordered thirty years 
earlier were at long last initiated. 
11. Id. at 238–39 (noting that court was “answering the determinative question of Texas 
criminal law of whether there was a judgment of conviction at the time the governor issued 
a commutation order” and concluding that “[a]s soon as mandate issued, Petitioner’s 
conviction and sentence were vacated, our order for a new trial became final, and the case 
was returned to the point it would have been had there never been a trial,” then holding that 
“[t]he purpose of commutation is to reduce a sentence that was already imposed,” that “the 
Texas Constitution grants power of commutation ‘after conviction,’” that “[h]ere there was 
no conviction, and no sentence to reduce,” and that “[b]ecause there was no longer a death 
sentence to commute, the governor’s order had no effect”);  see also Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 
at 806 (“[T]he Fifth Circuit certified the following question to the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals: ‘What was the status of the judgment of conviction after these events [the 
issuance of the mandate and the commutation of the sentence] occurred?’”). 
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The proceedings in the trial court revealed the first hint of 
the State’s strategy of resistance: the district attorney took the 
position that the CCA had been wrong when it held that 
Hartfield could raise the speedy-trial claim in a pre-trial writ. 
The trial court, however, was not inclined to take up the 
prosecutor’s suggestion that it effectively overrule the State’s 
highest criminal court, and so it addressed the merits of the 
claim. 
As was appropriate, the trial court used the four-factor test 
announced in Barker v. Wingo13 as the framework for its 
speedy-trial analysis. Concluding that three of the four factors 
weighed in favor of Hartfield, it also found that the third 
factor—Hartfield’s delayed assertion of the right—weighed 
against him so heavily that he was not entitled to relief. As we 
later argued on appeal, the trial court failed in analyzing the 
third factor to consider at least three salient matters: 
The CCA had ordered a new trial, but the trial court 
had neither initiated new proceedings nor taken any 
steps to have Hartfield returned to county custody 
from State custody in preparation for a trial; 
Because Hartfield was in State custody throughout 
the delay, his case was fundamentally unlike those 
in which an individual who is entitled to a new trial 
but living in freedom is found to have an 
affirmative obligation to act; and 
Hartfield is intellectually disabled. 
All these factors should have been considered in the court’s 
analysis because any one of them might have made a difference 
in the outcome. 
Once we appealed the trial court’s decision to the Texas 
Thirteenth Court of Appeals, the district attorney’s office re-
urged the position it had taken in the trial court: that the CCA 
13. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The four Barker factors, the third of which is analyzed in 
greater detail below, see infra pp. 184–87, are “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, 
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had been wrong when it identified the pre-trial writ of habeas 
corpus as an appropriate vehicle by which to raise the speedy-
trial claim. This time, however, the court took up the district 
attorney’s invitation and ruled—in a stark repudiation of the 
CCA’s order—that Hartfield’s claim was not cognizable in a 
pre-trial writ.14 We immediately asked the CCA to grant 
discretionary review to enforce its earlier decision. Without 
explanation, the CCA refused. 
Having failed when using a procedural vehicle identified by 
the state’s highest criminal court as an appropriate way in which 
to raise the speedy-trial claim, we resorted to a pre-trial habeas 
petition in federal court.15 When the district court denied habeas 
relief, we appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which set the case for 
argument. Before the argument could occur, however, the State 
began an accelerated push to commence trial proceedings in 
state court and Hartfield was quickly convicted.16 The Fifth 
Circuit then dismissed the habeas petition as moot, holding that 
in order to proceed on a pre-trial habeas petition in federal court, 
a petitioner must be under no conviction when the habeas court 
issues its opinion. 
Hartfield returned again to the state courts. His second trial 
had been the quintessence of a perfunctory procedure given the 
three-decade delay. Many important witnesses had died; those 
still alive possessed only faded memories; and most critically, 
much of the physical evidence—including the murder weapon 
and the victim’s car—had been lost, making it impossible to test 
Hartfield’s claim of innocence with scientific analysis that might 
have shown whether Hartfield actually came into contact with 
either. Despite this prejudice to Hartfield, the jury did not find 
Hartfield guilty of capital murder, as the State had hoped. 
Instead, Hartfield’s jury found him guilty of simple murder and 
sentenced him to life in prison. 
14. Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d at 808 (“Because a pretrial habeas proceeding is not an 
appropriate avenue for raising a speedy-trial claim, we vacate the portion of the trial court’s 
order denying Hartfield’s petitions for writ of habeas corpus, and we dismiss Hartfield’s 
appeals.” (citation omitted)). 
15. While our petition was pending, the State attempted to coerce Hartfield into 
agreeing not to seek speedy-trial relief. That attempt was unsuccessful. See infra page181. 
16. See Hartfield v. State, 516 S.W.3d 57 (Tex. App. 2017) (indicating that Hartfield’s 
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Hartfield then appealed a second time to the Texas 
Thirteenth Court of Appeals, which on this occasion addressed 
the merits of the speedy-trial claim. It found that Hartfield’s 
right to a speedy trial had been violated, ordering that the 
indictment against him be dismissed with prejudice. But the 
government was not through resisting. It asked the CCA to grant 
discretionary review, and after the CCA declined to do so, the 
attorney general’s office asked the United States Supreme Court 
to grant certiorari. On November 27, 2017, the Court denied the 
petition. In the meantime, Hartfield had been released. 
III. A CLOSER LOOK
On September 17, 1976, somebody murdered Eunice Lowe, 
who worked at the Continental Trailways bus station in Bay 
City, Texas. Her car and the money from the cash drawer at the 
ticket counter were both taken from the bus station, and there 
was evidence that she had been sexually assaulted after her 
death.17
A. The Criminal Investigation 
The first lead in the case came from Deputy Sheriff Dennis 
Brooks, who told Texas Ranger Carl Weathers, head of the 
investigation, that he had been called to the residence of an older 
woman the day before the murder about a black man who had 
come into her house saying he needed to use the phone. The 
man had given Brooks a false name,18 and it is not clear from the 
record how Brooks came to the decision that this had been Jerry 
Hartfield.
Edward Becerra, a possible alternative suspect, was at the 
bus station twice on September 17. When he first arrived around 
4:45 that afternoon, he saw a black man sitting in the station and 
Lowe sitting at the counter. Becerra returned to the locked 
17. Brief for the State of Texas at 10, Hartfield v. State, 2016 WL 3410809 (Tex. App. 
May 6, 2015) (No. 13-15-00428-CR) [hereinafter Texas Brief]; see also Pérez-Peña, supra
note *. 
18. Texas Brief, supra note 17, at 102 (indicating that Brooks had seen a man he 
identified as Hartfield trying to talk two women into letting him use their phone, and that 
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station around 7:00 that evening, but was able to enter through a 
side door. Because the counter was unattended, he boarded a bus 
without buying a ticket and gave his ticket money to the bus 
driver instead. Becerra got off the bus in a town about thirty 
miles away, where Bay City police officers found him and 
brought him back to Bay City. Becerra was somehow able to 
convince the officers that he did not kill Lowe. He told them that 
he saw a black man in the bus station, and the officers had a 
sketch artist compose a sketch based on Becerra’s description 
even though Becerra told the sketch artist that “to [him], all 
black guys look alike.”19 Brooks identified the man in the sketch 
as Hartfield; that identification and the sketch were used to 
support the arrest warrant issued on September 18.20
Hartfield told Brooks on September 16 that he was going to 
go to Wichita, which prompted Weathers to call the authorities 
in Wichita and tell them to be on the lookout for Hartfield. An 
officer in Wichita called Weathers the next day to let him know 
that officers in Wichita had apprehended Hartfield, who refused 
to waive extradition. Weathers, accompanied by Bay City Police 
Detective Doug Holland, went to Wichita “hoping that 
[Hartfield] would sign a waiver of extradition.” Weathers read 
Hartfield his rights as soon as he met him, and Hartfield’s 
response—according to Weathers—was to ask why he could not 
go back to Texas. In front of Weathers, Holland, and a Kansas 
magistrate, Hartfield signed a waiver of extradition, about which 
the Kansas attorney who had been appointed to represent 
Hartfield on extradition was not consulted. Though it was 
already fairly late, the officers took Hartfield to Ardmore, 
Oklahoma, that evening.21
19. Id. at 12 (indicating that Becerra was at bus station twice on day of murder, was 
later taken by police to view victim’s body, stated that he did not kill her, and gave police 
artist description of man he saw sitting in station that afternoon); see also Brief for 
Appellant at 5, Hartfield v. State (Tex. App. Mar. 17, 2016) (No. 13-15-00428-CR) 
(indicating that Becerra statement to artist is in trial record) [hereinafter Hartfield Brief].
20. Texas Brief, supra note 17, at 101–03 (reproducing statements made in probable-
cause affidavit in support of arrest warrant). 
21. Hartfield Brief, supra note 19, at 6 (indicating that Weathers statement of intent is 
in trial record); see also Texas Brief, supra note 17, at 110–12 (indicating that Hartfield 
said he wanted to go back to Texas, that he signed a waiver of extradition, and that officers 
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When they set out for Texas the next morning, Holland, 
who was armed, sat in the back seat next to Hartfield. According 
to Weathers, Hartfield told Weathers and Holland partway 
through the trip, “I been lying to y’all. I want to tell you the 
truth,” and then told them where they could find Lowe’s vehicle. 
The Rangers were later able to locate it using information 
purportedly provided by Hartfield.22
 Continuing their trip, Weathers, Holland, and Hartfield 
stopped at the courthouse in Hillsboro, Texas, where a local 
deputy joined Weathers, Holland, and Hartfield in small room, 
where Weathers reportedly typed Hartfield’s confession.23 After 
Hartfield signed the document, Weathers, Holland, and Hartfield 
continued to Bay City. Their first stop in Bay City was a local 
hospital, because the officers wanted a doctor to examine 
Hartfield to “make sure nothing was wrong with him, no black 
eyes, no busted lips, no bruises, no nothing.”24
Weathers and Holland then took Hartfield before a 
magistrate judge so that he could appoint counsel for Hartfield. 
The magistrate appointed two local lawyers who questioned 
Hartfield in front of Weathers and Holland. Hartfield reportedly 
told his new attorneys that the officers had read him his rights, 
had not abused him, and were the nicest officers he had ever 
met. According to Weathers and Holland, Hartfield also told 
them that the statement he signed was true and that he had killed 
Lowe.25
22. Hartfield Brief, supra note 19, at 7 (indicating that trial record shows that Holland 
rode in back seat while armed and that Weathers testified to Hartfield’s purported 
statement); see also Texas Brief, supra note 17, at 47 (indicating that Hartfield “led police 
to Lowe’s car”).
23. Hartfield Brief, supra note 19, at 8; see also Texas Brief, supra note 17, at 87.  
24. Hartfield Brief, supra note 19, at 8 (indicating that Weathers statement about 
Hartfield’s physical condition is in trial record). 
25. Texas Brief, supra note 17, at 88. The lawyers and the magistrate have all since 
died, so we were not able to ask any of the three about this unusual interaction between the 
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B. The Trial and Direct Appeal, 1977–1983 
Hartfield was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to 
death in June 1977.26 He appealed on numerous grounds. On 
September 17, 1980, the CCA unanimously reversed, holding 
that the State had wrongly struck a potential juror because of her 
reservations about the death penalty,27 and ordered a new trial. 
On October 2, 1980, the State sought leave to file a motion 
for rehearing, urging the court to reform the sentence to life 
imprisonment instead of remanding for a new trial.28 The State 
subsequently asked the court to reconsider its decision. 
Alternatively, the State asked for a reasonable period of time to 
seek a commutation of Hartfield’s sentence from the governor.29
On November 26, 1980, the court granted the motion for leave 
to file the motion for rehearing. The State could have sought to 
have Hartfield’s sentence commuted at this time. It did not. Had 
the State done so, had the governor commuted Hartfield’s 
sentence, and had the CCA subsequently denied Hartfield relief 
on the remaining claims raised in his appeal, the commutation 
would have been effective.30 But that is not what happened. 
Instead, not until January 31, 1983 (five days after the CCA 
finally denied the State’s motion for rehearing31), did the district 
attorney, the district court judge, and the county sheriff write the 
Board of Pardons and Paroles (BPP) to request that Hartfield’s 
26. See, e.g., Amended Appeal Brief, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that “Jerry Hartfield was 
convicted of the capital murder of Eunice Lowe and sentenced to death in June 1977”). 
27. Hartfield v. State, 645 S.W.2d 436, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (relying on 
Witherspoon v. Ill., 391 U.S. 510, 520–23 (1968)); see also Adams v. Tex., 448 U.S. 38, 
43–45 (1980) (applying Witherspoon to the specific procedure Texas employs in capital 
cases). While a finding today that a Texas defendant is entitled to Witherspoon relief would 
result in that defendant’s receiving only a new sentencing trial, the statute providing a 
procedural mechanism by which an appellate court can issue such an order was not enacted 
until 1991. See TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 44.29(c) (West 2018). Prior to 1991, an error 
in a capital trial that related only to punishment required that the defendant receive a new 
guilt-phase trial as well. 
28. See Hartfield, 645 S.W.2d at 442.
29. Id. The court that ultimately granted Hartfield relief found that the State’s 
requesting time to seek a commutation constituted unequivocal proof “that the State 
consciously developed an alternative plan to avoid retrying Hartfield after” the CCA issued 
its opinion ordering it to do so. Hartfield, 516 S.W.3d at 68.
30. See O’Pry v. State, 642 S.W.2d 748, 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (holding June 1 
commutation effective after CCA remanded because of Witherspoon error on May 20). 
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sentence be commuted. Their letter to the BPP conceded that “it 
would be extremely difficult for the State to re-try [Hartfield] 
after over 6 years has passed.”32
On February 10, the BPP had not acted, and the State 
moved for leave to file a second motion for rehearing. However, 
because the ruling on the first motion for rehearing did not 
change the disposition of the case, a second motion for rehearing 
was not permissible.33 Consequently, the motion for leave to file 
was denied on March 1, 1983, and the CCA issued its mandate 
on March 4, 1983. “As soon as mandate issued, [Hartfield’s] 
conviction and sentence were vacated, [the CCA’s] order for a 
new trial became final, and the case was returned to the point it 
would have been had there never been a trial.”34
The Wharton County district clerk received the mandate on 
March 9, 1983. Neither the district attorney nor the district court 
judge made any attempt to inform either the Governor or the 
BPP that the CCA had issued a mandate directing a new trial; no 
other State official made any attempt to do so. The State took no 
steps toward carrying out the mandate. Instead, on March 15, 
1983, the Governor signed a document purporting to commute 
Hartfield’s sentence to life in prison. The Wharton County clerk 
then returned a postcard to the clerk of the CCA saying that the 
mandate had been carried out. In reality, however, “[b]ecause 
32. See Amended Appeal Brief, supra note 8, at 7 (quoting letter). 
33. Hartfield, 403 S.W.3d at 236 n.1 (explaining that Rule 309(f), which was in effect 
during the early 1980s, provided that “[i]f the Court delivers an opinion on rehearing which 
changes the disposition of the cause from that on original submission, the losing party may 
file a motion for rehearing within 15 days after said opinion is delivered,’’ and deeming it 
“likely” that the State’s motion for a leave to file a second motion for rehearing was denied 
“because our opinion on rehearing did not change the disposition of the cause from that on 
original submission; thus a second motion for rehearing was not a viable option for the 
State”). The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, which now contain the rules for both 
civil and criminal appeals, have retained a similar limitation. TEX. R. APP. P. 79.5 (West 
2018) (providing that no second motion is permitted if the first motion for rehearing is 
denied, but “[i]f rehearing is granted and the Court delivers an opinion on rehearing, a 
party may file a further motion for rehearing”).
34. Hartfield, 403 S.W.3d at 239 (footnote omitted); see also Hartfield, 516 S.W.3d at 
68 (“[T]he court of criminal appeals laid out a procedure and timetable for the State to 
properly effect its plan [to seek commutation], including the time sensitivity of obtaining 
the governor’s commutation order balanced with the court of criminal appeals’ mandate 
procedures. The State did not meet these deadlines, despite having actual knowledge of 
them, including the possible repercussions of not meeting them, and the court of criminal 
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there was no longer a death sentence to commute, the governor’s 
order had no effect,”35 and Hartfield was still entitled to the new 
trial ordered by the CCA in his first appeal. The State made no 
attempt to correct the clerk’s mistake, notifying neither the CCA 
nor the Governor that the CCA’s mandate was not carried out. 
C. Hartfield’s Efforts to Be Heard, 2006–2012 
1. Post-Conviction Habeas in the CCA 
Acting with the help of another prisoner, Hartfield filed a 
state application for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus on 
November 14, 2006.36 He supplemented the application with a 
handwritten pleading filed on November 27, 2006, in which he 
raised a speedy-trial claim.37 On January 31, 2007, the CCA 
denied the application without a written order.38 Hartfield again 
attempted to raise his speedy-trial claim in a post-conviction 
habeas application, but that application was dismissed on May 
30, 2007.39
2. Mandamus in the CCA 
At roughly the same time, Hartfield attempted to ask the 
CCA to compel a new trial using a petition for a writ of 
mandamus.40 The CCA denied his motion for leave to file the 
petition and so did not consider it.41
35. Hartfield, 403 S.W.3d at 239; see also Whan v. State, 485 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1972) (Onion, J., dissenting) (“If this court has reversed a conviction and 
issued its mandate, it would not appear that the Governor, prior to a new trial, could grant a 
pardon or commute the punishment previously assessed.”).
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3. Habeas and Mandamus in Federal Court 
a. The Southern District of Texas 
On October 22, 2007, Hartfield filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas raising two claims: that his right to 
due process had been denied by the trial court’s failure to retry 
him and that he was being detained by an illegal sentence.42 That
same day, he also filed a petition for a writ of mandamus asking 
the federal district court to order the State to either retry him or 
release him.43 On October 3, 2008, Magistrate Judge Stephen 
Smith appointed the federal public defender’s office to represent 
Hartfield.44 Judge Smith concluded that “Hartfield [was] not in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court” because the 
trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence ceased to exist 
once the CCA issued its mandate and “no subsequent event 
[had] changed [that] simple fact.”45 Consequently, he construed 
Hartfield’s application as filed under 28 U.S.C. § 224146 and 
found that venue was not proper in the Southern District because 
Hartfield was being held at a facility in the Eastern District,47
and the case was subsequently transferred to the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.48
b. The Eastern District of Texas 
Magistrate Judge John Love recommended that Hartfield’s 
petition be dismissed without prejudice because he had failed to 
42. Id.; see also Hartfield v. Quarterman, 603 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (S.D. Tex. 2009). 
43. Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, Hartfield v. Quarterman, (E.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 
2011) (No. 6:09-cv-00098). 
44. Hartfield, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 947. 
45. Id. at 955 (emphasis in original). 
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (“[W]ith respect to habeas 
petitions ‘designed to relieve an individual from oppressive confinement,’ the traditional 
rule has always been that the Great Writ is ‘issuable only in the district of confinement.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
48. Hartfield, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 956 (concluding that although Hartfield’s petition 
could have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, “the more appropriate course of action” 
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exhaust state remedies.49 District Judge Michael Schneider 
adopted the recommendations and dismissed Hartfield’s petition 
without prejudice on April 29, 2011,50 holding that either a pre-
trial habeas application or a motion to set aside the indictment 
would have been a procedurally appropriate vehicle for 
presenting Hartfield’s claim to the state courts.51
c. The Fifth Circuit 
Both sides appealed. Finding no controlling state precedent 
regarding the status of Hartfield’s conviction and sentence, the 
Fifth Circuit certified that question to the CCA on November 28, 
2012.52 We became Hartfield’s counsel at this point because the 
attorneys of the federal public defender’s office could not follow 
the case into state court. 
IV. RESOLUTION, 2013–2017
A. The Certified Question at the CCA 
The CCA answered the certified question on June 12, 2013, 
holding that Hartfield was “under no conviction or sentence,”53
but finding that he should have raised his speedy-trial claim in 
either a motion to set aside the indictment or a pre-trial
application for habeas relief.54 Heeding that instruction, we filed 
49. Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge, Hartfield v. 
Dir., No. 6:09-cv-00098, 2011 WL 1630346, at *7. 
50. Hartfield v. Dir., No. 6:09-cv-00098, 2011 WL 1630201, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 
2011).
51. Id. at *4. 
52. Hartfield v. Thaler, 498 F. App’x 440, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing status of 
case and certifying question: “[T]he Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a district 
court’s judgment of conviction and capital sentence, did not address the defendant’s other 
claims of error, and ordered a new trial due to a Witherspoon error. Later, the court 
resolved two motions for leave to file for rehearing and issued its mandate that still 
required a new trial, but no new trial was ever conducted because the Governor purported 
to commute the defendant’s sentence. . . . Finding no controlling precedent under Texas 
law, we hereby certify the following determinative question to the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals: What was the status of the judgment of conviction after these events occurred?”)  
53. Hartfield, 403 S.W.3d at 240.  
54. Id. at 239–40 (explaining reasons for earlier procedural denials of attempted post-
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Hartfield’s pre-trial application for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
130th Judicial District of Texas on June 20, 2013.55
B. The Habeas Petition in the 130th Judicial District 
The State moved to dismiss Hartfield’s application, arguing 
that a speedy-trial claim was not cognizable in a pre-trial habeas 
application. But while the CCA had ruled in other cases that a 
speedy-trial claim is not cognizable if raised in a pre-trial 
application,56 it had made clear in its June order that Hartfield’s 
claim was in fact cognizable if raised in a pre-trial writ.57 The 
court denied the State’s motion on this ground, heard the habeas 
application on December 19, requested two rounds of post-
hearing briefs, and then took no further action. 
Hartfield’s petition remained pending for almost ten 
months. Believing that by failing to issue a ruling the trial court 
was subverting the will of the CCA, compounding the violation 
of Hartfield’s right to a speedy trial, and squandering judicial 
resources, we filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the 
Texas Thirteenth Court of Appeals on April 7, 2014, which had 
the effect of causing the trial court, at long last, to act on 
Hartfield’s application. On April 10, the court entered findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. We received both the April 7 
order and the trial court’s findings and conclusions on April 
11.58
petition, and suggesting that Hartfield file either motion to set aside indictment or pre-trial 
application for writ of habeas corpus). 
55. In early July 2013, Hartfield was returned to county custody. This marked the first 
step by the State toward giving Hartfield the new trial that the CCA had ordered thirty 
years before. Other new lawyers were soon appointed to represent him at the second trial, 
and preparations for that trial occurred concurrently with proceedings pursuant to the 
habeas application on which we represented him. 
56. See, e.g., Smith v. Gohmert, 962 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (opining 
that “a defendant seeking to compel a dismissal of an indictment on speedy trial grounds 
has an adequate remedy at law” and need not resort to a writ). 
57. Hartfield, 403 S.W.3d at 240 (“Petitioner could have filed an application under 
[Texas Code of Criminal Procedure] Article 11.08.”); see TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 
11.08 (providing that “[i]f a person is confined after indictment on a charge of felony, he 
may apply [for habeas relief] to the judge of the court in which he is indicted”).
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C. The Appeal to the Thirteenth Court of Appeals 
We immediately appealed the trial court’s decision to the 
Texas Thirteenth Court of Appeals, which concluded that 
Hartfield’s claim was not cognizable in a pre-trial habeas 
application, notwithstanding the CCA’s determination that it 
was.59 The court held that the proper vehicle in which to raise 
Hartfield’s speedy-trial claim was a motion to set aside the 
indictment, which could—if denied—be appealed in direct 
appeal proceedings after trial.60
D. Discretionary Review in the CCA 
The day after the Thirteenth Court of Appeals issued its 
opinion, we filed a petition for discretionary review in the CCA. 
The sole grounds for review were whether Hartfield’s speedy-
trial claim was cognizable in a pre-trial habeas application and, 
if so, whether his right to a speedy trial had in fact been violated. 
The first issue had been resolved fourteen months earlier when 
the CCA ruled that a pre-trial application was one of two means 
by which Hartfield could raise his speedy-trial claim.61 Yet this 
time the CCA refused Hartfield’s petition without explanation, 
silently permitting an intermediate appellate court to prevent 
him from using the very procedure that the CCA itself—in its 
capacity as the highest criminal appellate court in Texas—had 
already identified as appropriate. 
We filed a motion for rehearing, which the CCA denied 
without explanation. This left Hartfield with a ruling from the 
59. Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805, 817 (Tex. App. 2014) (concluding that the 
CCA did not intend to overrule its prior precedents with its earlier reference to article 
11.08, speculating that the CCA might not have intended to indicate that “Hartfield could 
have filed a petition under article 11.08 to advance his speedy trial claim,” and suggesting 
that its omission of “that specific language,” was done purposefully, “perhaps to indicate 
that Hartfield could have used article 11.08 to advance his contention that he was in prison 
despite the fact that he was under no conviction or sentence” instead), discretionary rev. 
refused (Aug. 27, 2014).
60. Id. at 814–15 (discussing Hartfield’s pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment and 
holding that “Hartfield’s post-conviction appeal of the trial court’s denial of his motion to 
dismiss his indictment is his avenue to assert his speedy-trial claim, not the drastic remedy 
of pretrial habeas relief”).
61. Hartfield, 403 S.W.3d at 240 (pointing out that “[a]lternatively, Petitioner could 
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CCA directing him to use a pre-trial writ, a ruling from an 
intermediate court of appeals telling him that he could not use 
one, and a ruling from the CCA indicating that it had no 
objection to the lower court’s contradiction of the initial CCA 
ruling. We were momentarily stymied. But meanwhile, 
Hartfield’s new trial—the one that the CCA had ordered in 
1980—was set to commence in August 2015. 
 E. The Speedy-Trial Claim in Federal Court Again 
Less than three weeks after the CCA denied the motion for 
rehearing, we presented Hartfield’s now-exhausted speedy-trial 
claim to the federal district court in a petition filed under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241, naming the sheriff of the county in which 
Hartfield was incarcerated as defendant. The sheriff answered 
by filing a motion for summary judgment on December 3, 
2014.62
By February 9, 2015, the federal district court had yet to act 
on either Hartfield’s § 2241 petition or the State’s motion for 
summary judgment. We believed then that the State was still 
attempting to coerce Hartfield to accept the plea offer, and so 
filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The State’s response 
to our motion included an exhibit consisting of the transcript 
from a status hearing in the state court indicating that Hartfield 
had by then rejected the State’s offer.63 The State argued in 
62. Around this time, the State began its attempt to bring a quick resolution to the state 
trial proceedings and to preclude the federal court from granting Hartfield relief on his 
speedy-trial claim by approaching Hartfield’s state-court trial attorneys with a plea offer. 
The State maintained that it intended to seek the death penalty—despite Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002), in which the Supreme Court had declared execution of the 
intellectually disabled unconstitutional—but offered to allow Hartfield to plead guilty to 
murder instead of capital murder if he would agree to forego pursuing relief on his speedy-
trial claim and accept a life sentence. The State initially gave Hartfield until the first week 
of January 2015 to accept this offer, but later extended the deadline to February 6, 2015. 
Our knowledge of the plea offer was at first limited to what Hartfield’s trial 
attorneys shared with us. We learned more when the State entered the transcript of a 
February 18, 2015, status hearing at which Hartfield stated that he had rejected the State’s 
offer into the record of the § 2241 action. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.   
63. See Respondent Osborne’s Response in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction with Brief in Support at Exhibit C, Hartfield v. Osborne, (S.D. Tex. 
Mar. 3, 2015) (No. 4:14-cv-03120), ECF No. 15 (showing, via relevant pages copied from 
verbatim transcript of February 18, 2015, status conference, that Hartfield had been advised 
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consequence that Hartfield could not show irreparable injury if 
his request for an injunction was denied. 
On April 21, 2015, the court granted the State’s motion for 
summary judgment and denied Hartfield’s request for an 
injunction, holding that he had failed to demonstrate 
circumstances that would justify consideration of his speedy-
trial claim on pre-trial habeas review.64 But finding that 
Hartfield’s “decades-long confinement without a valid criminal 
conviction” was a “substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right,” the court granted Hartfield a certificate of 
appealability on the issue of whether his claim presented the 
special circumstances required to justify consideration of the 
speedy-trial claim in pre-trial proceedings.65
F. The New Trial in State Court 
The prejudice that Hartfield faced at his second trial was 
significant: evidence was missing, witnesses were dead. As one 
observer put it, “[t]he murder weapon could not be found and 
Lowe’s car no longer existed.”66 And “[m]any of the more than 
125 people on the prosecution’s witness list [were] dead or 
could not be found and some witness testimony from the 1977 
trial was read into the retrial [which meant that Hartfield’s 
attorney] could not cross-examine them.”67 As if this were not 
enough to “raise questions about the fairness of the retrial,” 
vaginal swabs taken during the autopsy “had been lost,” as had a 
soda bottle found at the crime scene “on which the State claimed 
Hartfield’s fingerprint had been found.”68 Despite the prejudice 
he faced,69 the jury did not find Hartfield guilty of capital 
64.  Hartfield v. Osborne, No. 4:14-cv-03120, 2015 WL 1880449, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 
21, 2015).
65. Id.
66. Matt Ford, The Retrial of a Texas Man Imprisoned Despite an Overturned 




69. We summarized the circumstances bluntly in our response to the State’s petition for 
certiorari a couple of years later, pointing out that although the State had alleged all along 
that Hartfield: “1) killed Ms. Lowe with a pickaxe, 2) sexually assaulted her, and 
3) absconded in her car, [b]y the time of his 2015 trial, the State had 1) lost the pickaxe, 
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murder but instead found him guilty of the lesser-included 
offense of murder and sentenced him to life in prison. 
G. The Fifth Circuit Declares the Federal Action Moot 
A month after Hartfield’s second trial concluded, we filed a 
Rule 28j letter70 in the Fifth Circuit, informing the court of the 
result of the new trial. The following day, the State filed a 28j 
letter arguing that Hartfield’s appeal could no longer proceed 
pursuant to § 2241 and was instead governed by § 2254.71 On 
December 16, 2015, the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion adopting 
the rule of Yellowbear v. Wyoming Attorney General,72 holding 
that intervening events—Hartfield’s conviction and life 
sentence—meant that Hartfield’s speedy-trial claim could at that 
point proceed only under § 2254 even though it had been 
properly filed under § 2241.73 The court dismissed Hartfield’s 
appeal, leaving his claim susceptible to review by the federal 
courts only after he exhausted his speedy-trial claim via post-
trial proceedings in state court.74
car to her family.” Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 
17, Hartfield v. State, (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017) (No. 17-394) [hereinafter Cert Opposition]. 
70. See FED. R. APP. P. 28(j) (“If pertinent and significant authorities come to a party’s 
attention after the party’s brief has been filed . . . a party may promptly advise the circuit 
clerk by letter.”). 
71. That statute pertains to applications for writs of habeas corpus filed by persons in 
custody pursuant to state court judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012). 
72. 525 F.3d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 2008) (discussing “unusual procedural posture” of 
case, and noting that “§ 2241 is a vehicle for challenging pretrial detention, . . . or for 
attacking the execution of a sentence,” while § 2254 provides “the proper avenue for 
attacking the validity of a conviction and sentence” (citations omitted)).  
73. Hartfield v. Osborne, 808 F.3d 1066, 1072 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Yellowbear, 525 
F.3d at 924 (pointing out that an attack on a state-court conviction and sentence should be 
brought under § 2254). The Fifth Circuit's reasoning is discussed at greater length below. 
See infra pages 193–97. 
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H. The Speedy-Trial Claim Goes Back to State Court, 
2016–2017
1. The Trial Court’s Findings on the Barker Factors 
On January 20, 2016, the trial court entered amended 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, which varied only 
slightly from the findings that it had entered in 2014. 
The court held that the first Barker factor,75 which was 
never in dispute, weighed against the State. Even measuring 
from the date on which the CCA’s mandate became final,76
thirty years had elapsed before the State took any action toward 
carrying out the new-trial mandate. 
It also found that the delay was caused by the State’s 
negligence and that Hartfield had done nothing to cause the 
delay, indicating that the second Barker factor also favored 
Hartfield. While the State had consistently argued it could not 
have known that the governor’s commutation was not effective 
until June 2013, the trial court found that the language in the 
CCA’s opinion on direct appeal emphasized that commutation 
must occur prior to the mandate.77
In contrast, the trial court found that the third Barker
factor—whether Hartfield asserted his right to a speedy trial—
weighed heavily against him. The court correctly noted that 
Hartfield waited until 2006 to file a pleading that could be 
considered an assertion of his right to a speedy trial, but held 
that nothing Hartfield filed in state court prior to the June 20, 
2013, application (and nothing he ever filed in federal court) 
asserted the right. Focusing on Hartfield’s failure to use the 
correct form and the lack of proof that his filings were received 
either by the prosecutor’s office or the trial judge, the court 
failed to consider Hartfield’s intellectual disability, his 
incarceration throughout the years-long delay, or the CCA’s 
retrial order. 
75. See note 13, supra, and accompanying text. 
76. In cases involving a retrial, the delay to be considered begins at the moment the 
defendant is first accused and ends when his retrial commences. Emery v. State, 881 
S.W.2d 702, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Under this rule, the delay in Hartfield’s case was 
one month shy of thirty-nine years. 
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Although the court’s presumption that Hartfield had been 
prejudiced by the delay satisfied the fourth Barker factor, the 
court also held that Hartfield had produced “scant evidence of 
actual prejudice.”78 This finding ignores reality: Hartfield was 
unable to have any of the physical evidence subjected to forensic 
analysis because the State had lost most of it, and several 
witnesses, including some who were never cross-examined 
during his first trial, died before the second trial. The absence of 
physical evidence and the deaths of witnesses who had not been 
cross-examined at the initial trial prejudiced Hartfield’s defense. 
2. Our Arguments on Appeal 
Because it was the only Barker factor on which the trial 
court found against Hartfield, we focused on the trial court’s 
analysis of the third factor. We argued first that because 
Hartfield was in state custody throughout the period of delay, it 
was not entirely clear that Barker’s third factor applied at all. 
We also pointed out that, while some courts have found that an 
incarcerated person has a duty to assert the right,79 we were 
aware of no cases like Hartfield’s, in which the incarceration 
itself has been held unlawful. In this circumstance, we argued, 
only the State should have been required to take affirmative 
steps. Our second argument was that, to the extent that Barker’s 
third factor was relevant, the trial court erred in failing to take 
into account the fact that Hartfield has an IQ of around fifty-
eight, reads on a first-grade level, and can write only the 
simplest words.80 Finally, we argued that the trial court erred in 
finding the documents that Hartfield filed pro se during 2006 
and 2007 insufficient to assert his right to a speedy trial. He 
complained in those pro se filings that he had not had a second 
trial,81 and a speedy-trial claim need only unambiguously alert 
78. Pet. for Cert. at 13, Texas v. Hartfield, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 473 (Sept. 14, 2017) 
(No. 17-394).  
79. See infra Part V.
80. Amended Appeal Brief, supra note 8, at 24. 
81. See, e.g., id. at Exhibit D (referring in Mandatory Judicial Notice to “violation of 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,” complaining that 
“the petitioner never went back to be retrided,” and citing Barker as relevant to analysis of 
whether “a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated”), 
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the State of the delay and the defendant’s lack of acquiescence 
to it.82
3. The Opinion of the Thirteenth Court of Appeals 
The court of appeals found that the length of the delay 
weighed heavily against the State.83 By holding that the delay 
was merely sufficient to trigger analysis of the remaining three 
Barker factors,84 however, the court ignored CCA precedent 
holding that “a length of delay extending beyond the minimum 
amount of time required to trigger a full Barker analysis weighs 
heavily against the State because ‘the longer the delay, the more 
the defendant’s prejudice is compounded.’”85
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the 
State had acted negligently.86 It also “disagree[d] with the 
State’s legally untenable position that it was unaware of the 
invalid commutation in order to justify the delay.”87 The court 
held that the State was made aware of the effect of the CCA’s 
mandate by the language in its 1983 opinion, finding that this 
second Barker factor also weighed heavily against the State.88
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that 
Hartfield’s failure to assert his right to a speedy trial from 1983 
to 2006 weighed against him.89 However, it disagreed with the 
trial court’s conclusion that Hartfield’s filings in state and 
federal court between 2006 and 2013 did not constitute 
retried,” pointing out that the 1983 reversal had been “for a new trial,” and complaining 
that Hartfield had “never seen his day in court going on 24 years” (emphasis in original)). 
82. See generally id. (expanding our arguments). 
83. Hartfield, 516 S.W.3d at 65.
84. See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–52 (1992) (“Simply to trigger 
a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial 
has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” 
(citation omitted)).
85. Hartfield, 516 S.W.3d at 65 (quoting Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801, 809 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2014)); see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 (indicating that “the court must then 
consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the 
bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim”).
86. Hartfield, 516 S.W.3d at 68.
87. Id.
88. Id. (characterizing CCA’s 1983 language describing “procedure and timetable” for 
state to follow as “clear and unambiguous”). 
89. Id. at 69–70 (recognizing State’s duty to bring defendant to trial, but also noting that 
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assertions of his speedy-trial claim.90 It held those filings 
sufficient to make the State aware that Hartfield did not 
acquiesce in the delay and that they therefore constituted 
assertions of his right to a speedy trial.91 Accordingly, the court 
found that Barker’s third factor weighed against Hartfield.92
And the court of appeals also agreed with the trial court that the 
fourth Barker factor—i.e. whether Hartfield was prejudiced by 
the delay—weighed against the State.93
Balancing the Barker factors, the court concluded that 
Hartfield’s constitutional right to a speedy trial had been 
violated and ordered that the State’s indictment against Hartfield 
be dismissed with prejudice.94 The State filed a petition for 
discretionary review with the CCA, which refused it, then filed a 
petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court that 
was denied on November 27, 2017.95 The State informed us the 
next day that it would not seek rehearing. And with that, 
Hartfield’s criminal justice nightmare at long last reached its 
end.
V. ANALYZING THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL:
ACCOUNTING FOR THE DEFENDANT’S PERSONAL
CHARACTERISTICS IN A BARKER ANALYSIS
The Barker of Barker v. Wingo was arrested on suspicion of 
killing an elderly couple in Kentucky.96 The case against his co-
90. Id. at 70 (“On the other hand, we cannot ignore Hartfield’s repeated assertions of 
his right to a speedy trial from 2006 to 2013 in state and federal court proceedings.”).
91. Id.; see also Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (holding 
that to be considered an assertion of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, a 
communication need only unambiguously alert the State of the delay and the defendant’s 
lack of acquiescence to it); Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 651 n.40 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2002) (same).
92. Hartfield, 516 S.W.3d at 70 (“[L]ike the trial court, we weigh this factor against 
Hartfield due to the twenty-three-year inactivity in his case, but not as heavily, because of 
Hartfield’s state and federal court efforts to his [sic] assert his right to a speedy trial 
beginning in 2006.”). 
93. Id.
94. Id. at 71. This is the “only possible remedy” when a court finds that a defendant’s 
constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 
434, 440 (1973). 
95. Texas v. Hartfield, No. 17-394, 2017 WL 4099612 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2017). 
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defendant Manning was stronger than the case against Barker, 
and believing that it needed Manning’s testimony to convict 
Barker, Kentucky proceeded first against Manning.97 But 
because of two hung juries and two reversals, the 
Commonwealth had to try Manning six times.98 By the time of 
the sixth trial, Kentucky had on fourteen separate occasions 
asked the trial court to delay Barker’s trial, but Barker had 
objected to only one of those requests for continuance—the 
twelfth.99 After Manning’s last trial, Kentucky moved twice 
more for continuances, and Barker opposed both motions.100 The 
Court held nonetheless that his right to a speedy trial had not 
been violated. 
The Barker Court did not hold that Barker’s right to a 
speedy trial had not been violated simply because he had failed 
to assert it. The finding was based instead on Barker’s repeated 
statements that he was unopposed to the State’s motions for 
continuance.101 In fact, the Court expressly denounced what it 
referred to as a demand-waiver rule: “We reject . . . the rule that 
a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives 
his right,”102 because “presuming waiver of a fundamental right 
from inaction is inconsistent with [the] Court’s pronouncements 
on waiver of constitutional rights.”103
Consistent with this analysis, the Court did not presume 
waiver in Barker’s case, but recognized that the record showed 
that he had repeatedly failed to speak when he might have 
asserted his right to a speedy trial. Hartfield’s case was different. 
Both the trial court and the court of appeals presumed that 
Hartfield had waived his right to a speedy trial during the period 
from 1983 to 2006 only because the record was silent on 
whether he wanted during those years to be tried a second 
97. Id.
98. Id. at 516–17. 
99. Id. at 517–18. 
100. Id.
101. Id. at 536 (“[B]arring extraordinary circumstances, we would be reluctant indeed 
to rule that a defendant was denied this constitutional right on a record that strongly 
indicates, as does this one, that the defendant did not want a speedy trial. We hold, 
therefore, that Barker was not deprived of his due process right to a speedy trial.”). 
102. Id. at 528 (citation omitted). 





      06/11/2018   08:46:58
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 41 Side A      06/11/2018   08:46:58
DOWNEWBERRYRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2018 3:15 PM 
A CRIMINAL JUSTICE NIGHTMARE 189
time.104 This amounts to imposition of just the sort of demand-
waiver rule that the Barker Court criticized.105
Moreover, Hartfield’s case demonstrates the importance of 
accounting for the personal characteristics of the defendant who 
attempts to assert the right to a speedy trial. There is, for 
example, a manifest unfairness in imposing the same duty to 
assert the right on incarcerated defendants as is imposed on free 
defendants.106 Because being incarcerated makes it more 
difficult to assert one’s rights, requiring incarcerated defendants 
to make explicit requests for speedy trials also encourages the 
State to keep more defendants incarcerated during the pre-trial 
period. This is wrong. No defendant should have to ask a trial 
court to do what an appellate court has ordered it to do. 
Hartfield’s case is illustrative. Because the State did not 
take the initial step of having him brought back to the county of 
conviction until thirty years after the CCA’s mandate issued, he 
spent much of his life incarcerated in a prison hundreds of miles 
away from the officials to whom his demand for a speedy trial 
needed to be made. The State apparently expected him to 
compose and file a pleading in a distant court in order to raise a 
104. Hartfield, 516 S.W.3d at 69 (noting the record contained no explanation for 
Hartfield’s failure to assert his right to a speedy trial between 1983 and 2006).  
105. The Texas courts are far from the only state courts that regularly assume on silent 
records that defendants acquiesce to delay. See, e.g., People v. Crane, 743 N.E.2d 555, 
565–66 (Ill. 2001) (speculating about possible strategic reasons for defendant’s failure to 
make speedy-trial claim and concluding that “defendant’s failure to assert his right to a 
speedy trial should not be viewed as a completely neutral factor”); cf. Ex parte Stevens, 
499 So. 2d 795, 799–801 (Ala. 1996) (Maddox, Shores & Houston, JJ., dissenting) (noting 
that defense attorney made no effort to supplement appellate record with defendant’s letters 
to clerk requesting trial, and concluding that finding below that defendant’s right to speedy 
trial had not been violated should not have been reversed). Though it seems to be what is 
required under Barker, we are aware of only one state whose courts hold explicitly that 
Barker’s third prong should not be found to weigh against a defendant merely because of a 
silent record: see, e.g., State v. Springer, 400 P.3d 231, 2017 WL 3034065, at *2 (Mont. 
2017) (holding that delay alone does not prove that a defendant did not want a speedy 
trial); State v. Zimmerman, 328 P.3d 1132, 1140 (Mont. 2014) (“In order to weigh 
Zimmerman’s inaction against him for purposes of Factor Three, the record must establish, 
one way or another, whether he actually wanted a speedy trial.”). 
106. People v. MacDonald, 27 Cal. App. 3d 508, 514 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (recognizing 
practical obstacles to incarcerated defendant’s asserting right to speedy trial). The 
Oklahoma courts do not appear to require an incarcerated defendant to request a speedy 
trial. See State ex rel. Trusty, 525 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974) (discussing 






      06/11/2018   08:46:58
40357-aap_18-2 Sheet No. 41 Side B      06/11/2018   08:46:58
DOWNEWBERRYRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2018 3:15 PM 
190 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
speedy-trial claim. Yet Hartfield reads at primary-school level; 
he is incapable of writing a demand letter, an application for 
relief, or a motion. The State’s expecting this intellectually 
disabled and illiterate prisoner to compose his own speedy-trial 
demand was inappropriate. And it was manifestly unfair for both 
the trial court and the court of appeals to fail to consider 
Hartfield’s intellectual disability when determining the weight to 
assign to his failure to assert his right to a speedy trial. 
Especially in cases in which appellate courts have 
overturned convictions or sentences and ordered that defendants 
be retried, it is unfair to require these defendants to assert their 
right to speedy trials. Yet it is nonetheless not unusual for courts 
to require them to do so.107 Hartfield’s case is typical in this 
respect. And although not every case will involve incarceration 
and intellectual disability, any special factors relevant to the 
defendant’s situation should be considered. Speedy-trial review 
does not require the court to act so quickly that it must replace 
consideration of the defendant’s circumstances with a 
reasonable-person standard or other rule of thumb. Instead, each 
speedy-trial case should be evaluated in light of the personal 
characteristics—intellectual disability, for example, or 
incarceration, extreme youth, advanced age, or a history of 
severe mental illness—that might compromise the defendant’s 
ability to ask for a speedy trial. 
VI. WHAT HARTFIELD’S ORDEAL TEACHES APPELLATE COURTS
AND APPELLATE LAWYERS ABOUT FEDERAL PRE-TRIAL HABEAS
Hartfield’s attempt to obtain pre-trial habeas relief from the 
federal courts ultimately raises two important issues. The first is 
whether the appropriate legal vehicle is determined by the 
petitioner’s status as of the date of filing, or instead by the 
petitioner’s status as of the date of decision (or perhaps even by 
107. See, e.g., Lahr v. State, 615 N.E.2d 150, 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (characterizing 
defendant’s efforts to raise speedy-trial claim as “neither particularly timely nor vigorous” 
and finding no violation); cf. Nickerson v. State, 629 So. 2d 60, 64–66 (Ala. 1993) 
(recognizing that trial judge ignored new-trial order and concluding that violation had 
occurred, but also seeming to suggest that proof of defendant’s knowing failure to assert 
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the petitioner’s status on some other date).108 The second is 
whether, even assuming that a change in the petitioner’s status 
between the date of filing and the date of decision bears on 
which vehicle is appropriate, the criteria for obtaining relief 
under § 2254 are so different from those under § 2241 as to 
justify the Fifth Circuit’s decision to dismiss Hartfield’s appeal. 
A central theme of contemporary habeas jurisprudence in 
cases challenging state convictions or sentences stresses the 
tension between vindicating federal constitutional rights and 
preserving the integrity and autonomy of state criminal 
process.109 The possibility of federal pre-trial relief lifts that 
tension to a far higher level. For that reason, the criteria that 
must be satisfied before federal courts grant pre-trial relief in 
cases that originate in state courts are strict,110 and concerns of 
federalism dictate that the availability of pre-trial relief should 
be at least as daunting as the availability of post-conviction 
relief.111 But pre-trial relief, albeit rare, is at times warranted.112
108. In Yahn v. King, 2015 WL 1814313 (N.D. Cal. 2015), a district court in California 
suggested that Ninth Circuit cases indicate that the date of filing is determinative. See id. at 
*2 (referring to Ninth Circuit cases indicating that prisoner’s status at time of filing is all 
that matters for selecting jurisdictional basis for habeas petition (citing Stow v. Murashige, 
389 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2004), which treated petition filed under §2254 as if it were filed 
under § 2241); McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2003) (same). The same appears 
to be true of the Sixth Circuit. Smith v. Coleman, 521 F. App’x 444, 447 n.2 (6th Cir. 
2013) (stating that nature of claims raised and status of petitioner at time of filing 
determine court’s standard of review).  
109. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991) (noting that 
independent and adequate state ground doctrine will, for example, “bar federal habeas 
when a state court declined to address a prisoner’s federal claims because the prisoner had 
failed to meet a state procedural requirement” and that, in cases of this type, “the state 
judgment rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds”).
110. Oddly, the statutory provision pertaining to post-trial relief generally requires 
exhaustion, whereas the provision permitting relief prior to judgment contains no such 
requirement. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) with 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012). 
Nevertheless, despite the absence of an express exhaustion provision in § 2241, the federal 
courts have implied one. See, e.g., Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 
503 (1973) (Rehnquist & Powell, JJ. & Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing history); 
Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 442 (3d Cir. 1975) (acknowledging that “an exhaustion 
requirement has developed through decisional law, applying principles of federalism” and 
explaining that “although there is a distinction in the statutory language of §§ 2254 and 
2241, there is no distinction insofar as the exhaustion requirement is concerned”). 
111. E.g., Frisbee v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1952). 
112. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252–53 (1886); see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 
(1963) (discussing history); DeYoung, 515 F.2d at 443 (discussing jurisprudential 
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Precisely because a pre-trial grant of habeas relief is so 
intrusive, effectively short-circuiting the state criminal process, 
its availability is cabined by principles similar to those 
implicated in abstention doctrine.113 Hence, pre-trial habeas 
relief is available only if there are special or extraordinary 
circumstances. Yet the critical concept of special or 
extraordinary circumstances is not delineated with great clarity 
in the caselaw. Nevertheless, the cases recognize at least two 
scenarios in which relief may be available: if the state is acting 
in bad faith or if the violation of the federal right is perfectly 
apparent.114
Citing Hartfield’s thirty-year saga as the quintessence of 
special circumstances, we sought the rare remedy of federal pre-
trial habeas relief on his behalf. The district court dismissed the 
petition, concluding that he had not shown special circumstances 
warranting relief. On appeal, we argued that this conclusion was 
flawed for several reasons: 
The state courts had engaged in a game of bait-and-
switch, with the CCA holding that Hartfield could 
raise the speedy-trial claim in a pre-trial writ, 
113. The classic statement of the principles of abstention in the face of an ongoing 
criminal proceeding is Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger abstention can 
apply in the § 2241 context. E.g., Evans v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 959 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d 
Cir. 1992); Carden v. Mont., 626 F.2d 82, 83–85 (9th Cir. 1980) (discussing general rule 
prohibiting pre-trial habeas relief and recognizing it as “logical implication of the 
abstention doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris ”); Neville v. Cavanagh, 611 F.2d 673 
(7th Cir. 1979) (affirming denial of pre-trial habeas petition because of abstention 
considerations even though defendant had exhausted state remedies); Kolski v. Watkins, 
544 F.2d 762 (5th. Cir. 1977) (indicating that petitioner should proceed through state trial, 
and could if necessary seek federal habeas relief afterward); Gibson v. Orleans Parish 
Sheriff, 971 F. Supp. 2d 625 (E.D. La. 2013) (finding no extraordinary circumstances and 
abstaining on Younger grounds); see also Braden, 410 U.S. at 493 (“We emphasize that 
nothing we have said would permit the derailment of a pending state proceeding by an 
attempt to litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court.”).
114. E.g., Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 519 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Younger). For a useful discussion of what these circumstances might comprise, see Aydiner 
v. Giusto, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1133–37 (D. Ore 2005). To see some examples of bad 
faith—cases in which the state had no prospect of obtaining a valid conviction—review, 
for example, Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971) (opining that “[o]nly in cases of 
proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope 
of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where 
irreparable injury can be shown is federal injunctive relief against pending state 
prosecutions appropriate”); Gibson, 971 F. Supp. 2d at 631 (discussing illustrative 
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followed by a decision of the intermediate court of 
appeals holding precisely the opposite, followed in 
turn by the CCA’s refusal to enforce its earlier 
judgment. This pattern of behavior, we argued, 
epitomized bad faith. 
In view of the overwhelming strength of the speedy-
trial argument, any conviction that the state court 
might have obtained would almost surely have been 
invalid.
State officials had not only refused to implement the 
CCA’s order of a new trial for over three decades, 
but the state had continually exercised control over 
Hartfield for that entire time, imprisoning him 
without a valid conviction; and 
There was simply no way for Hartfield to receive a 
fair trial after a thirty-year delay, given the State’s 
loss and destruction of critical evidence—including 
even the murder weapon—and the deaths of 
important witnesses. 
But once Hartfield’s federal action was well underway, the 
State finally began the process of providing him a new trial. And 
after our brief for Hartfield had been filed in the Fifth Circuit, he 
was again convicted in state court. Hence, by the time we 
appeared before the Fifth Circuit to argue in favor of reversal, 
the posture of the case had changed. As the court put it with 
some understatement, “Hartfield’s state court conviction 
following the district court proceedings, but prior to our hearing 
his case on appeal, places this case in an unusual procedural 
posture.”115
In short, the question before the district court, given that 
Hartfield had not yet been convicted when he appeared pursuant 
to § 2241, was whether he had shown the special circumstances 
warranting relief. When the notice of appeal was filed, and when 
the appeal briefs were filed, the central question was unchanged: 
Were special circumstances present? By the time of argument, 
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however, Hartfield was under a judgment of conviction, and 
therefore his case appeared to fall within § 2254, which pertains 
to those “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
court,”116 not under § 2241. 
As the Fifth Circuit noted, § 2254 includes constraints on 
the availability of habeas relief not contained in 
§ 2241.117 The initial question, therefore, was whether § 2254 
was applicable even though the notice of appeal and the habeas 
petition were both filed while Hartfield’s case was still 
obviously one that arose under § 2241. In addressing this 
question, the court did not adopt the rule, prevalent elsewhere, 
that it is the content of the petition that matters—which is to say 
that a petition filed pursuant to § 2241 can if circumstances 
warrant be treated as having been filed under § 2254.118
116. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (requiring exhaustion of state remedies), with 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 (requiring inquiry into whether special circumstances exist before federal 
court can address merits of underlying claim); see also Hartfield, 808 F.3d at 1068 
(discussing differences between § 2254 and § 2241). 
117. Hartfield, 808 F.3d at 1071–73 (citing Medberry v Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049 (11th 
Cir. 2003)). 
118. See, e.g., James v. Walsh, 308 F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that it is “the 
substance of the petition, rather than its form,” that governs); cf. Cook v. N.Y. St. Div. of 
Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 277–78 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that “the fact that Cook invoked 
section 2241 did not, however, require the district court to treat it as a section 2241 
petition,” and that “if an application that should be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is 
mislabeled as a petition under section 2241, the district court must treat it as a section 2254 
application instead” (citations omitted)). The Fifth Circuit’s summary of its differing 
analysis in Hartfield bears quoting in full: 
Hartfield filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241. Hartfield argued that his right to a speedy trial had been violated by the 
State of Texas because the State had held him in prison for approximately thirty 
years without a valid state court judgment and without retrying him consistent 
with the mandate of the State’s highest criminal court. The district court denied 
Hartfield’s petition, reasoning that federal courts do not reach the merits of 
speedy-trial claims on pretrial habeas review absent “special circumstances.” 
However, the court issued Hartfield a certificate of appealability as to whether 
“special circumstances” are present in this case. Although Hartfield was not in 
custody pursuant to a state court judgment when he originally filed his petition, 
he was convicted by a Texas state court following the district court’s decision. 
Because he has been convicted, any writ of habeas corpus granted by a federal 
court will necessarily free him from custody pursuant to a state court judgment. 
Therefore, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 now applies to Hartfield’s petition. Section 2254 
imposes a specific exhaustion requirement on habeas petitioners, which involves 
a different inquiry than whether “special circumstances” exist. Because the 
existence of “special circumstances” is no longer relevant and because we lack 
jurisdiction over anything related to § 2254 based on the certificate of 
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Instead, recognizing that the question was one of first 
impression in the Fifth Circuit, the court looked to Yellowbear
and held that if a prisoner is convicted after the date on which 
the habeas petition is filed, it must be brought under § 2254.119
But this reliance on Yellowbear was peculiar, because 
Yellowbear himself filed a federal habeas petition pursuant to 
§ 2241 while his state trial was underway, and, aware of that 
context, the federal district court dismissed his action for failure 
to exhaust.120 Yellowbear then appealed, and during the 
pendency of the appeal he was—like Hartfield—convicted, but 
this superficial similarity to what happened to Hartfield is 
precisely that: superficial. Hartfield filed his federal action well 
in advance of the commencement of his long-delayed state trial, 
not in the midst of it; in fact, at the time he filed, it was not at all 
clear when the state proceedings would commence. 
The Fifth Circuit was correct to point out that the issue in 
the district court was whether Hartfield had shown special 
circumstances warranting pre-trial relief. Despite finding that he 
had not done so, the district court granted him a certificate of 
appealability on that very question.121 We argued in the Fifth 
Circuit that he was nevertheless entitled to relief, even under the 
limitations set by § 2254, but the Fifth Circuit identified three 
reasons for declining to address the speedy-trial violation: 
The question presented in the notice of appeal—
whether special circumstances were present—was 
no longer relevant because proof of special 
circumstances is not required by §2254; 
The district court had not reached any conclusion 
about Hartfield’s claim under § 2254; and 
Hartfield, 808 F.3d at 1068 (emphasis in original). 
119. In so holding, the court perplexingly cited a Ninth Circuit case holding that the 
status of the petitioner at the time of filing—i.e., whether he is incarcerated pursuant to a 
state court judgment when the petition is filed—controls whether the petition should 
proceed under § 2241. Hartfield, 808 F. 3d at 1072 n.1 (citing Stow); see supra note 108. 
120. Yellowbear, 525 F.3d at 923. 
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The Fifth Circuit believed that it lacked jurisdiction 
over any issue other than the special-circumstances 
question identified in the notice of appeal.122
It is not so much that these observations are wrong as that each 
can be overcome with a simple response. Thus, if the Fifth 
Circuit had wanted to address the merits, it could have done so. 
By declining to address the merits, the court unfortunately let 
the interplay of these observations create an incentive for the 
State to engage in gamesmanship. An opinion on the merits 
could have avoided this result, and the merits of Hartfield’s 
speedy-trial claim were identical whether the vehicle for 
addressing it was § 2241 or § 2254. Moreover, as the Fifth 
Circuit acknowledged, Hartfield had exhausted his state-court 
remedies, removing a potential procedural bar to its taking 
action.
Hartfield’s notice of appeal identified the special-
circumstances issue, but notices of appeal are to be construed 
functionally and this one demonstrated that Hartfield was 
complaining about the district court’s refusal to address his 
speedy-trial claim. If the function of the notice of appeal is to 
put both the appellee and the court on notice of the issues that 
122. The filing of a notice of appeal as required by Rule 3(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure is mandatory and jurisdictional. E.g., Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 
(1992). However, the rule’s dictates are to be construed liberally. E.g., id. at 248; Foman v. 
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181–82 (1962) (indicating that mere technical failures to comply with 
requirements of Rule 3 are insufficient to make notices of appeal ineffective). Moreover, in 
deciding whether a notice of appeal confers appellate jurisdiction over a specific issue, the 
court must remember that “it is the notice afforded by a document, not the litigant’s 
motivation in filing it, that determines the document’s sufficiency as a notice of appeal.” 
Smith, 502 U.S. at 244. And in evaluating whether the notice of appeal has notified the 
parties and the court which issues the appellant seeks to have reviewed, the court does not 
examine the notice in a vacuum but “in the context of the record as a whole.” Kotler v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1221 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 505 U.S. 
1215 (1992). 
A final point is worth mentioning. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure permit 
the suspension of most rules. FED. R. APP. P. 2. While the express terms of Rule 2 do not 
permit the court to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal in most situations, the Rule 
does not prohibit the court from reading a notice of appeal more generously than a literal 
reading would permit. And members of the Fifth Circuit in particular have read notices of 
appeal to create maximum jurisdiction. Marts v. Hines, 117 F.3d 1504, 1515 & n.12 (5th 
Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Garwood, King, Higginbotham, Smith, Duhé, Garza, Benavides & 
Dennis, JJ., dissenting) (recognizing that “the initial appellant’s notice of appeal gives the 
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the appellant seeks to have reviewed, and if the content of the 
notice is to be interpreted in context, the Fifth Circuit can have 
had little doubt about Hartfield’s claim that three decades of 
delay violated his right to a speedy trial. Of course the district 
court had not addressed that question, but review in the Fifth 
Circuit would have been de novo whether Hartfield or the State 
had prevailed in the district court. The Fifth Circuit should have 
addressed the question in the interest of judicial economy. 
Indeed, because the speedy-trial analysis includes consideration 
of whether the defendant has been prejudiced by the passage of 
time, the Fifth Circuit was perfectly positioned to undertake that 
analysis. If there had been any doubt about prejudicial delay 
when Hartfield filed his petition, that doubt had been resolved 
conclusively by Hartfield’s conviction at his long-delayed 
second trial, which was compromised by the disappearance of 
critical evidence and the deaths of several witnesses, and had 
concluded with a new murder conviction before the Fifth Circuit 
issued its opinion. 
The Fifth Circuit could have taken a straightforward path to 
address the speedy-trial question. Its unwillingness to pursue 
that path and its resorting instead to mechanical reasoning has 
created another opportunity for states to violate defendants’ 
rights to speedy trials. Hartfield’s case demonstrates that a state 
can ignore an order to grant a defendant a new trial, and if the 
defendant resorts to pre-trial federal habeas pursuant to § 2241, 
the state can hurriedly try the defendant in the hope that a guilty 
verdict will be obtained, rendering the defendant’s § 2241 filing 
moot.
The wiser course would have been for the Fifth Circuit to 
hold that if the state trial has not begun when the federal petition 
is filed, an action under § 2241 is permitted and need not be 
dismissed if the state trial concludes with a verdict against the 
defendant before the federal habeas action has been decided. 
Given the implicit exhaustion requirement in § 2241, there is 
little chance that a state defendant could rush to federal court in 
an attempt to outrace the commencement of state criminal 
proceedings, but if such an unusual circumstance were to arise, 
the federal court could simply hold that special circumstances 
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VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In an interview conducted the day he was released, 
Hartfield said that he was not bitter and was not angry with the 
people responsible for holding him for over thirty years under no 
conviction or sentence.123 But we should be angry for him. We 
should not be angry at any one person or even any particular 
group of people, but instead at the systemic failure that resulted 
in Hartfield’s nightmare. 
Every part of the system failed him: the state trial court; the 
state’s intermediate court of appeals (which rejected Hartfield's 
pre-trial attempt to obtain relief and therefore caused him to 
endure two additional years of unlawful confinement); the CCA 
(which four times elevated form over substance and then refused 
to enforce its own judgment); the federal district courts and the 
Fifth Circuit;124 and, most of all, the state prosecutors in both the 
district attorney’s office and the office of the Attorney General. 
It took far too long, but at last, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals 
correctly recognized that it was a nightmare not only for 
Hartfield, but also for the “system at-large.”125
Short of executing someone who is actually innocent, it 
would be difficult to conjure up a case more tragic than 
Hartfield’s. The State ignored the CCA’s new-trial mandate for 
over thirty years, and the CCA allowed its mandate to be 
ignored. Even once the judges of the CCA learned that Hartfield 
had been incarcerated under no conviction or sentence for over 
twenty years, they did nothing, hiding behind the justification 
that this intellectually disabled man, acting with only the advice 
and counsel of a fellow inmate, had chosen the wrong 
procedural vehicle by which to raise his claim. Meanwhile, the 
state’s lawyers, rather than acknowledging their predecessors’
error, repeatedly attempted to justify it as they blocked 
Hartfield’s attempts to get a new trial. Then, faced with a 
123. Andrew Cohen, The Man Who Spent 35 Years in Prison Without a Trial,
MARSHALL PROJECT—CASE IN POINT (June 12, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject 
.org/2017/06/12/the-man-who-spent-35-years-in-prison-without-a-trial. 
124. Obviously, the federal courts are not responsible for the injustice Hartfield 
endured. But both the trial courts and the Fifth Circuit declined to take action that could 
have ended the ordeal sooner. In any episode of colossal injustice many players will bear 
responsibility, and in Hartfield’s case, the federal courts do not escape without blame. 
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question of first impression presented in an extraordinary case, 
the Fifth Circuit chose not to do justice, but to adopt a rule that 
incentivized the State’s procedural gamesmanship. And it 
exacted no penalty for the State’s wrongfully incarcerating a 
man for more than half his life. 
There are no good guys in this story. The ending is hopeful, 
but not exactly happy. If this case presents a lesson for the rest 
of us, it is that courts have the power to do justice for a reason: 
that they might use it. 
